From 1942 to 1946 the United States of America, acting by and through the U. S. Army Corp of Engineers, set about to develop, create, and employ an atomic weapon. This endeavor sprang from the fear that Germany was already engaged in a similar program which, if successful, would mean catastrophe for the Allies. The American program, supported by Canada and Great Britain, was known as the Manhattan Project. 

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The Manhattan Project was colossal on every level. The technical obstacles were so many that in the early days of the project some scientists wondered if it would be possible to create  an atomic weapon at all. In the end it was successful in achieving its goal of bringing World War Two to an end.

 

Unfortunately, little effort was made to protect Manhattan Project workers at Oak Ridge, particularly at the Y-12 plant, from the extreme health hazards that were inherent with the processes and procedures used to produce the highly enriched uranium in the atomic bomb detonated above Hiroshima. As it turned out, the Japanese were not the only victims of "Little Boy."

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On October 30, 2000, some 55 years, 2 months, and 24 days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the 106th Congress of The United States of America effectively admitted as much when it enacted the "FISCAL YEAR 2001 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT" (Public Law 106-398). Reference is here made to Section 3602, of Title XXXVI, of Division C, which reads in part, (with emphasis added to certain portions by me), as follows:

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SEC. 3602. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:

(1) Since World War II, Federal nuclear activities have been explicitly recognized under Federal law as activities that are ultra-hazardous. Nuclear weapons production and testing have involved unique dangers, including potential catastrophic nuclear accidents that private insurance carriers have not covered and recurring exposures to radioactive substances and beryllium that, even in small amounts, can cause medical harm.

(2) Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program and for several decades afterwards, a large number of nuclear weapons workers at sites of the Department of Energy and at sites of vendors who supplied the Cold War effort were put at risk without their knowledge and consent for reasons that, documents reveal, were driven by fears of adverse publicity, liability, and employee demands for hazardous duty pay.

(3) Many previously secret records have documented unmonitored exposures to radiation and beryllium and continuing problems at these sites across the Nation, at which the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies have been, since World War II, self-regulating with respect to nuclear safety and occupational safety and health. No other hazardous Federal activity has been permitted to be carried out under such sweeping powers of self-regulation.

(4) The policy of the Department of Energy has been to litigate occupational illness claims, which has deterred workers from filing workers' compensation claims and has imposed major  financial burdens for such employees who have sought compensation. Contractors of the Department have been held harmless and the employees have been denied workers' compensation coverage for occupational disease.

(5) Over the past 20 years, more than two dozen scientific findings have emerged that indicate that certain of such employees are experiencing increased risks of dying from cancer and non-malignant diseases. Several of these studies have also established a correlation between excess diseases and exposure to radiation and beryllium.

(6) While linking exposure to occupational hazards with the development of occupational disease is sometimes difficult, scientific evidence supports the conclusion that occupational exposure to dust particles or vapor of beryllium can cause beryllium sensitivity and chronic beryllium disease. Furthermore, studies indicate than 98 percent of radiation-induced cancers within the nuclear weapons complex have occurred at dose levels below existing maximum safe thresholds.

 

The act goes on to establish the "Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program," sometimes referred to as "EEOCIPA," for the "timely, uniform, and adequate compensation of covered employees and, where applicable, survivors of such employees, suffering from illnesses incurred by such employees in the performance of duty for the Department of Energy and certain of its contractors and subcontractors."

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On September 24, 2005, the following Y-12 class designation was added as a SEC (Special Exposure Cohort) employee class:

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Department of Energy (DOE) employees or DOE contractor or subcontractor employees who worked in uranium enrichment operations or other radiological activities at the Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee from March 1943 through December 1947 and who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters (excluding aggregate work day requirements) established for other classes of employees included in the SEC.